Many previous experiments have found that, consistent with myopic loss aversion, subjects invest more in risky assets if they anticipate receiving less frequent feedback about their returns, are shown their aggregated portfolio-level (rather than separate asset-by-asset) returns, or are shown long-horizon (rather than one-year) historical asset class return distributions. We study these results' implications for how financial institutions' returns disclosure policies would affect risk-taking. We find that aggregated returns disclosure treatments do not increase portfolio allocations to equities in an experiment where-in contrast to previous experiments-subjects invest in real mutual funds over the course of one year.
A remarkable series of experiments has found that subjects are more willing to invest in risky assets with positive expected returns if only aggregated returns are reported to them, rather than the individual component returns. Information aggregation along various dimensions produces this effect: reporting subjects' portfolio return over the last n ≥ 2 periods once every n periods rather than reporting single-period returns each period (Gneezy and Potters, 1997; Thaler et al., 1997; Gneezy, Kapteyn, and Potters, 2003; Bellemare et al., 2005; Haigh and List, 2006; Sutter, 2007; Langer and Weber, 2008; Fellner and Sutter, 2009; van der Heijden et al., 2011) , reporting subjects' portfolio-level returns rather than returns for each individual asset separately (Anagol and Gamble, forthcoming) , or reporting historical long-horizon return distributions of asset classes rather than historical one-year return distributions of asset classes (Benartzi and Thaler, 1999) . 1 These results are consistent with subjects suffering from myopic loss aversion (Benartzi and Thaler, 1995) , which is the combination of loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) and mental accounting (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984; Thaler, 1985 Thaler, , 1990 Thaler, , 1999 .
2 Aggregation frames encourage subjects to integrate multiple gamble outcomes into a single mental account. If these gambles are not perfectly correlated across time or across assets and the gambles have positive expected values, the resulting integration can lower the probability that the mental account is evaluated as having borne an overall loss. 3 Thus, integration makes the gambles appear more attractive to a loss-averse subject than if each gamble occupied its own separate mental account.
The strength and consistency of the experimental results constitute compelling evidence that myopic loss aversion is a real psychological phenomenon that responds to aggregation manipulations. In this paper, we consider a related but separate question: Would a financial institution increase the portfolio risk-taking of its clients if it started disclosing returns at a more 1 Guiso (2009) examines another aggregation manipulation that we do not test in this paper. He finds that asking subjects about their labor income risk before offering a hypothetical lottery makes them more likely to accept the lottery. 2 Loss-averse agents derive utility and disutility directly from gains and losses, and the disutility of a loss is greater than the utility of a gain of equivalent magnitude. Agents engage in mental accounting when they evaluate outcomes within a subset of their wealth portfolio-the "mental account"-in isolation from outcomes outside the mental account. 3 Aggregating gambles does not decrease the probability of an overall loss for all return distributions. But the loss probability does decrease, for example, when the aggregated gambles are drawn from the same normal distribution. See also Langer and Weber (2005) for examples of gambles for which prospect theory predicts that aggregation would decrease the willingness to invest due to diminishing sensitivity to magnitudes and nonlinear probability weighting.
aggregated level, and decrease risk-taking if it started disclosing returns at a less aggregated level?
Numerous authors have extrapolated from the existing experimental literature to suggest that the answer to this question is "yes." For example, Thaler et al. (1997) write, "Decisions made by employees covered by such [defined contribution pension] plans may vary considerably depending on how their investment opportunities are described and the manner and frequency with which they receive feedback on their returns." Gneezy and Potters (1997) observe that, "Manipulating the evaluation period of prospective clients could be a useful marketing strategy for fund managers." Haigh and List (2005) write that "institutions may have the ability to influence asset prices through changes in their information provisioning policies."
However, the typical investment environment has a number of features that may diminish the impact of disclosure policy on portfolio risk-taking, and previous experiments, which were not designed to address disclosure policy, abstracted away from these features:
1. Previous experimenters have had their subjects' undivided attention, along with complete control over information flows during the experiment, whereas aggregation manipulations by a single institution in a typical investment environment may have little power because of interference from or interactions with background information flows.
2. The experiments to date have been conducted over the course of one session, but the psychology of risk-taking over many days, months, or years may differ. For example, being shown returns more frequently may not shorten investors' evaluation periods in settings where natural evaluation periods such as a year or a quarter already exist.
3. Previous experiments have used laboratory assets that were not given labels such as "stocks" and "bonds." 4 When dealing with familiar assets such as stocks, bonds, and mutual funds, investors may have strong prior beliefs about what they should do. For example, they may employ context-specific heuristics such as, "Allocate 100 minus my age to stocks," which could blunt the effect of aggregation manipulations on portfolio choices.
We conducted an experiment that incorporates these features of typical investment environments that may be relevant for gauging the practical effect of disclosure policy. We 4 An exception is Anagol and Gamble (forthcoming) .
recruited 597 subjects from the general U.S. adult population to participate in a year-long study.
Each subject allocated $325 among four real mutual funds that cover the U.S. equity, international equity, U.S. bond, and U.S. money market asset classes. Subjects were free to reallocate their portfolio throughout the year, just as if they were making real investments in these mutual funds. We paid each subject whatever the $325 would have been worth at the end of the year if the money had been invested according to his or her choices. The large per-subject payment ensured that subjects remained interested in their experimental portfolio through the end of a one-year experiment. Haigh and List (2005) find that professional futures and options traders exhibit myopic loss aversion over individual gambles whose maximum possible gain is $10 and maximum possible loss is $4, so any null results that we find are probably not due to our portfolio stakes being too low.
We test four aggregation treatments, which we randomly assigned to subjects.
The first treatment varied how frequently subjects saw their returns by paying half of subjects to view their weekly returns on our study website once a week and paying the other half to view their biannual returns on our website once every six months. We paid subjects to view their returns on our website rather than simply emailing them their returns because emails are easily ignored, which would create less variation in viewing frequency across conditions and reduce our ability to detect a viewing frequency effect on portfolio risk-taking.
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The second treatment varied the level of detail subjects saw when they viewed their weekly or biannual returns. Half of subjects saw only their overall portfolio return over the last week or six months. The other half of subjects saw the return over the last week or six months of each individual asset they were holding. Because a screen available to all subjects showed the dollar value of each asset in their portfolio, subjects in the former group could, in theory, calculate their individual asset returns if they remembered the previous value of each asset. But we did not ourselves provide convenient access to these previous values, hindering this calculation. Similarly, subjects in the latter group could calculate their overall portfolio return from their individual asset returns, but we did not perform this calculation for them.
The third treatment varied the historical returns information shown to subjects. We showed some subjects graphs depicting the distribution of real one-year returns for U.S. equities, international equities, U.S. bonds, and U.S. money markets from 1971 to 2007. Others were shown the distributions of real annualized five-year returns for the four asset classes over the same time period. We also gave some subjects no historical returns information at all in order to see whether allocations were affected by seeing any version of the returns graphs.
The fourth treatment varied whether subjects who saw the historical returns graphs could also access information about the historical performance of mixed portfolios. Some subjects could only see historical return distributions of four "pure" portfolios, each invested 100% in one of the four asset classes offered. Other subjects could, via a Web interface, see return distributions of portfolios invested in whatever mix of asset classes they wished. The latter graphs might make more apparent the diversification benefits of holding multiple asset classes, thus encouraging greater investment in risky assets.
Our main dependent variable is the fraction of the experimental portfolio that is invested in equities at the beginning of the experiment. Any effect of the historical returns graphs would likely be most easily detected in the initial allocation, immediately after all subjects in the graph conditions were required to view the graphs. The previous literature on return feedback frequency also finds that individuals who know they will receive frequent feedback reduce their demand for risky assets starting in the very first period of the experiments, indicating that they prospectively anticipate the disutility from disaggregated ongoing return disclosure. 6 We find that none of the aggregation treatments significantly increase risk-taking. Seeing ongoing returns less frequently, seeing five-year instead of one-year historical return distributions, and having the ability to see historical returns of mixed portfolios do not affect the initial portfolio fraction allocated to equities. Seeing ongoing portfolio-level returns instead of ongoing asset-by-asset returns decreases equity allocations initially-the opposite of Anagol and Gamble's (forthcoming) result. This significant decrease, the significant difference between how often subjects in the weekly versus biannual return viewing treatments viewed returns on our study website, and the fact that weekly viewing treatment subjects were more significantly more likely than biannual viewing treatment subjects to report in an exit questionnaire that study 6 See Gneezy and Potters (1997) , Gneezy, Kapteyn, and Potters (2003) , Bellemare et al. (2005) , and Haigh and List (2006) . participation made them see market returns more often indicate that our failure to find a positive link between return aggregation and risk-taking is not due to our treatments having no effect on the information subjects received.
As a robustness check, we test whether our failure to detect the anticipated aggregation effects is due to loss aversion and mental accounting being rare in our subject population. At the end of the initial portfolio allocation task, we offered subjects a one-time gamble that gave them an equal chance of adding $8 to or subtracting $5 from their up-front participation payment.
Rabin (2000) and Barberis, Huang, and Thaler (2006) show that rejections of such small positive expected value gambles are difficult to explain without loss aversion and mental accounting.
Forty-seven percent of subjects rejected this gamble, indicating that loss aversion and mental accounting are common in our sample. Even within this subset of particularly myopically lossaverse subjects, aggregation does not significantly increase equity allocations. As another robustness check, we examine the effect of the treatments on allocations six months into the experiment and at the end of the experiment. None of the aggregation treatments generate significant effects on portfolio allocations at these later dates, indicating that aggregation effects do not emerge with a delay.
We also find that relative to when no historical asset class return information is shown, subjects initially invest 11 to 12 percentage points more in equities when they see either one-year or five-year historical asset class return distributions. This suggests that many individual investors are unaware of how high historical equity returns have been relative to their variance.
The effect of seeing historical return distributions is especially large among subjects who do not have a bachelor's degree.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section I describes our experimental procedure. Section II presents the main empirical results. Section III presents our robustness checks. Section IV concludes.
I. Experimental procedure

A. Subject recruitment
We recruited subjects in the summer of 2008 for a one-year investing experiment through the market research firm MarketTools. Figure 1 shows made their initial portfolio allocations in a non-crisis environment, many weeks before we entered a bear market of historic proportions. We will discuss in Section II.C evidence that the market's 18% decline from its October 2007 peak prior to the beginning of our recruiting period does not explain our null treatment effects.
We requested that our subjects be at least 25 years old and have an annual income of at least $35,000, so that it was more likely that they had some investable assets. All interaction with the subjects occurred through the Internet; we had no direct contact with them.
The initial invitation text introduced the faculty authors with our university affiliations in order to establish the credibility of the study. It then informed subjects that they would receive a $20 up-front participation fee for allocating $325 among four mutual funds. At the end of one year, we would pay them whatever their initial $325 portfolio was worth at that time, plus an additional amount for periodically checking their portfolio's return on the study website. The text concluded by telling the subjects that we expected the initial portfolio allocation to take thirty minutes to an hour, and that it would take no more than thirty minutes to an hour of additional time over the course of the next year to check their portfolio's return.
People interested in participating in the study clicked a link that took them to an informed consent page that described the task, the compensation scheme, and the expected time commitment again. The informed consent document also told subjects that they would 7 August 30, 2008 was a Saturday.
periodically receive e-mails with a link that they could click to see their portfolio's return, and that we would pay them for clicking on these links.
Giving informed consent took subjects to a registration page where they supplied their name and contact information and chose a password. In order to prevent anybody from registering for the study more than once, we blocked any attempts to register multiple times from the same IP address. Upon registration, an e-mail was sent to each subject with a link to click on in order to activate his or her account. 8 The link then took them to a login screen.
We recruited 600 subjects, but three of them did not participate after registering.
Therefore, our final sample consists of 597 subjects, whom we randomly assigned to one of eighteen experimental cells. Table 1 shows the distribution of our sample among the experimental cells. All subjects who did not see a historical returns graph had their ongoing returns reported to them at the aggregated portfolio level. The remaining treatment assignments are uncorrelated with each other. Table 2 groups the experimental cells in a different way to make clearer the comparisons we will be making in our analysis and the sample that is available for these comparisons. All of our aggregation treatment effects are estimated by comparisons between groups that contain at least 238 subjects each (40% of our sample); the return viewing frequency effects are estimated by a comparison between groups of at least 298 subjects each (50% of our sample). The effect of seeing any version of the historical returns graph is estimated by comparing the 120 subjects who saw no graph (20% of our sample) to the 477 subjects who did see one of the two graphs (80% of our sample). We will describe each experimental condition in further detail in Sections I.C and I.F.
B. Opening instructions screen
After logging in, subjects received a fuller description of the study instructions. Figure 2 shows the screen that subjects in one of our experimental cells saw when they logged in for the first time. Subjects in other cells saw variations of this screen. The instructions reiterated the nature of the portfolio allocation task and the compensation scheme, and informed subjects that they could reallocate their portfolio any time during the year by logging into their account on the website. Subjects were also told about the inducement to view their ongoing returns, as well as the content and frequency of the ongoing returns they would be paid to see. In some conditions, subjects were introduced to the historical returns graphing tool.
C. Historical returns graph treatments
For 80% of our subjects, the bottom of the initial experimental screen (such as the one shown in Figure 2 ) introduced a graphing tool that was intended to help them understand the historical real return distributions of four asset classes: U.S. equities, international equities, U.S.
bonds, and U.S. money markets. The remaining 20% of subjects did not see the graphing tool and did not receive any alternative information on historical returns. The graphs generated by the tool are modeled after those in Benartzi and Thaler (1999) . Returns for an asset class during the historical sample period are sorted from lowest to highest and displayed as a bar chart. The lowest return is the leftmost bar, and the highest return is the rightmost bar. The median return is also highlighted and labeled with its value. 9 We used the S&P 500, MSCI EAFE, Lehman Brothers U.S. Aggregate Bond Index, and 30-day U.S. Treasury bill as our asset class proxies.
Because the MSCI EAFE series starts in 1970, we cannot use returns prior to 1970 while maintaining identical sample periods for all asset classes. The most recent year of returns available at the start of the experiment was 2007. In order for each return series to have a unique median, we used the period from 1971 to 2007-which has an odd number of years-for all our asset classes. 10 Subjects who had the graphing tool available to them were required to click through an animation that explained how to interpret and use the graph before they could proceed to the next part of the study. This animation could also be replayed in later screens where the graphing tool was shown.
The graphs varied across treatments along two dimensions. The first dimension was whether one-year return distributions or five-year annualized return distributions were shown.
9 A programming error caused the bar immediately to the left of the median return to be highlighted instead for the first six months of the experiment, even though the correct median return number was displayed in the graph's caption. The paper's figures show the graphs with the shifted highlighting. The discrepancy was not visually apparent except in the one-year U.S. equities graph, where the median return was 10.61% but the highlighted bar corresponded to a 7.38% return. We used overlapping periods for the five-year distributions, so there were 33 bars shown on the five-year graph. The second dimension was whether subjects could see only the historical return distributions of four "pure" portfolios-each of which is invested 100% in a single asset classor could see the return distribution of any asset class mix they wanted. Figure 3 shows an example of a graph where one-year returns are being shown and only four pure portfolio distributions are accessible. Figure 4 shows an example of a graph where five-year returns are being shown and any portfolio's return distribution can be seen. These two figures also demonstrate how the graphing tool allowed subjects to compare the return distributions of two different portfolios side-by-side.
D. Initial portfolio allocation
Subjects made their asset allocations by specifying portfolio percentages to be invested in each investment option. For subjects who had access to the graphing tool, this choice was made after they saw the initial instructions screen and clicked through the animated explanation of the graphing tool. For subjects who did not see any historical returns graphs, the input boxes for the initial portfolio allocation were below the experimental instructions on the first screen.
Subjects could choose among four index funds offered by Northern Funds: the U.S. Stock
Index Fund, the International Equity Index Fund, the Bond Index Fund, and the Money Market
Fund. 11 We provided links to each fund's prospectus. We also informed subjects that the International Equity Index Fund charges a 2% redemption fee on the sale of shares held for less than thirty days. 12 For subjects who were shown the historical returns graphs, the graphing tool remained accessible on the same screen in which the portfolio allocation was entered in order to aid their portfolio decision. Figure 5 shows this screen for one of our experimental conditions.
Subjects could take as long as they wanted to make their portfolio decision. We did not (and could not) prevent subjects from consulting sources of information available outside of our website.
E. Post-allocation questionnaire
After subjects submitted their initial allocation, they completed a post-allocation questionnaire that elicited information on demographics, self-assessed investment knowledge, self-assessed confidence about their portfolio allocation, and time preference. As noted earlier,
we also offered subjects a gamble with a 50% chance of winning $8 and a 50% chance of losing $5. The outcome of the gamble depended on whether the high temperature at San Francisco Airport on a future date, as reported on the National Weather Service website, was an odd or even integer. We applied the gains and losses from this gamble to the $20 participation fee.
Expected utility maximizers with remotely reasonable risk aversion over large-stakes gambles
should always accept such a small-stakes, positive-expected-value gamble (Rabin, 2000; Barberis, Huang, and Thaler, 2006) . Therefore, subjects who refuse the gamble are particularly likely to be loss averse and prone to engage in mental accounting. Fehr and Goette (2007) show that in a field experiment on labor supply, only workers who rejected a similar gamble (50% chance of winning 8 Swiss francs and 50% chance of losing 5 Swiss francs) exhibited a negative elasticity of effort per hour with respect to an exogenous increase in the piece wage rate, consistent with their daily labor supply being determined by loss-averse preferences that are evaluated each day with a reference point around a target daily income level.
Upon finishing the questionnaire, subjects were taken to a page that showed their current investment allocation and total balance (see Figure 6 ). At this point, subjects could log out. On subsequent logins to the site that were not initiated by clicking an e-mailed link (the e-mails are described in Section I.F), subjects would see this portfolio status page first.
F. Ongoing returns viewing treatments
During the one-year duration of the experiment, half of subjects received e-mails once a week with a link they could click to view their previous week's return. These e-mails were sent on Saturdays, starting at the end of the subject's first full calendar week of participation. If they clicked the link within a week of receiving the e-mail, we added $1 to their final payment. Thus, if they clicked all of the e-mailed links they received during the one-year study, they would earn an additional $52. The other half of subjects received e-mails once every 26 weeks with a link they could click to view their prior six-month return. The dates these biannual e-mails were sent coincided with when these subjects would have otherwise received their 26th and 52nd e-mails if they had been assigned to receive weekly e-mails. If subjects receiving biannual e-mails clicked the link within a week of receiving the e-mail, we added $20 to their final payment. 13 We offered only $20 per viewing for this group because we anticipated that subjects receiving weekly e-mails would not click on every e-mailed link, and we wanted to equalize average returnviewing payments across treatments based on our best guess of treatment compliance.
Within each of the above two treatments, we varied the level of detail subjects saw when they clicked on the e-mailed link. Half of subjects saw a screen like that in Figure 7 , which showed the return of each individual asset they held. The other half of subjects saw a screen like that in Figure 8 , which showed only the overall return of their portfolio. 14 These return screens were only accessible via the e-mailed link (i.e., they could not be reached by following links within the study website). If a link in a given e-mail had already been clicked, clicking it again later would not lead to the return screen; this was to ensure that subjects receiving biannual e-mails did not see the returns screen more frequently that once every six months.
G. Treatment of interest, dividends, and trades
Dividends and interest were automatically reinvested in the fund that paid them. 15 All subjects were free to reallocate their portfolio at any time during the year by logging into their account and clicking a button on the portfolio status page that took them to a reallocation screen.
The reallocation screen (see Figure 9 ) showed the graphing tool relevant for the subject's experimental condition, 16 links to prospectuses, the current percentage allocations across the four mutual funds, and a note about the international fund's redemption fee. Four input boxes allowed 13 If an e-mail was sent on day t, the link reported returns through day t, even if the link was not clicked until day t + n. 14 When ongoing returns were reported asset by asset, if the e-mail was sent on day t, only assets held on day t were included in the returns list. Returns on assets completely liquidated prior to day t were not reported. If a subject previously held no position in an asset but established a position sometime between e-mail send dates, the asset return reported was for the full period between e-mails (one week or six months) and did not adjust for the fact that the asset was held for only part of the time between e-mails. 15 We used Yahoo! Finance for our dividend and price data. On July 1, 2008, Yahoo! erroneously reported a money market fund dividend of 28.8 cents per dollar invested, which was deposited into 339 of our subjects' accounts. The mean excess windfall was 4.5% of portfolio value. After the market close on July 31, 2008, we sent an e-mail to the affected subjects informing them of the error and (if applicable) how it had affected the July 5 weekly return reported to them. We let them keep the windfall but reallocated it (at the same time the e-mail was sent) in accordance with the subjects' initially chosen asset allocation. This reallocation raised average equity allocations by 1.0 percentage points among subjects receiving weekly e-mails and 2.2 percentage points among subjects receiving biannual e-mails. 16 The graphs shown to a given subject remained constant throughout the experimental period. That is, they were not updated in real time to reflect new returns that had been realized since the start of the experiment.
subjects to specify what their new portfolio allocation should be. Trades were executed at the next close of the U.S. markets and could be cancelled by the subject any time up to then.
H. Exit questionnaire
At the end of the one-year investment period, we administered an exit questionnaire to subjects. We will use in our analysis the questions that elicited objective measures of financial literacy, beliefs about stock market return autocorrelations, and the effect study participation had on subjects' attention to market fluctuations. Of the 597 subjects, 569 (95%) completed the exit questionnaire. Table 3 displays demographic and financial summary statistics on our subjects, which were collected in the questionnaire administered immediately after the initial portfolio allocation.
II. Main empirical results
A. Subject characteristics
Men slightly outnumber women, and the young are slightly overrepresented in our sample-33% of subjects are 35 or younger-although all ages have substantial representation. Our subjects are relatively well-educated, with 56% reporting holding a bachelor's degree or higher. The high average level of education is perhaps due to our request for subjects with annual incomes above $35,000; only 5% of subjects report an income less than that threshold, and the median subject reports an income between $50,001 and $75,000. The median subject reports total bank, brokerage, and retirement account assets of about $75,000, and 29% of our sample reports assets in excess of $100,000. Only 20% of our sample reports holding no stocks whatsoever in their personal portfolio. Table 4 shows measures of our subjects' financial literacy. The subjects' self-assessments were collected in the post-allocation questionnaire at the beginning of the experiment, and the measures of objective knowledge were collected in the exit questionnaire administered at the end of the one-year experimental period. The median subject considers himself a "somewhat knowledgeable" investor, "somewhat confident" that the portfolio decision was right for him, and "somewhat likely" to change his portfolio decision if he consulted a professional investment advisor. However, relative to the typical American, the subjects are very knowledgeable about basic financial concepts. Around 90% of subjects understand that $100 in a savings account yielding 2% interest per year would be worth more than $102 at the end of five years, that a stock mutual fund is safer than a single company's stock, and that stock returns fluctuate more than bond and savings account returns. In contrast, Lusardi and Mitchell (2009) With regards to market return serial correlation, 55% of subjects believe that a 10% rise in the market in one month should not change their prediction of the subsequent month's return.
Similarly, 55% believe that a 10% fall in the market in one month tells them nothing about the subsequent month's return. Among those who do not believe that the market follows a random walk, those who believe in positive serial correlation outnumber those who believe in negative serial correlation by a factor of three.
Since the experimental setup was simple (from the perspective of an individual subject) and the assets were passively managed funds in familiar asset classes, subjects did not necessarily need a long time to make a considered decision. The median subject who received no historical returns information took 14 minutes between login and submission of the initial portfolio allocation, as did the median subject who was only given the historical returns distributions of portfolios invested 100% in a single asset class. The median subject who was able to see the historical returns distribution of any portfolio mix took 13 minutes.
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B. Average asset allocations
The average portfolio percentages subjects held in each asset class at the beginning of the experiment are found in Table 5 . Subjects initially allocated 65.7% of their portfolio to equities-with 34.8% invested in international equities and 30.9% invested in domestic equities-18.6% to bonds, and 15.8% to money markets. The relatively high allocation to international equities may be due to this asset class's strong performance in the time immediately preceding the experiment. The most recent one-year before-tax return reported in the fund 17 We report medians because of outliers for whom the time between initial login and initial portfolio submission was extremely long. These subjects likely made their allocation over the course of more than one sitting.
prospectus was 25.76% for the international index fund, versus only 15.56% for the domestic equity index fund. Subjects initially held positive amounts in 3.66 asset classes out of 4, on average. Table 6 shows that our periodic e-mails to subjects were successful at creating significant variation in the frequency with which they visited the study website and viewed their returns.
C. Effects of ongoing return presentation aggregation
During the one-year investment period, subjects who received weekly e-mails logged into the website 60.7 times on average, versus only 18.2 times for subjects who received biannual e-mails. Under the weekly e-mail treatment, 45.3 of those 60.7 logins occurred because subjects clicked on an e-mailed link to view the screen with their ongoing returns. Thus, compliance with the link-clicking requests was high; 87.2% of weekly links sent were clicked within a week of receipt. In the biannual e-mail treatment, subjects clicked 73.8% of links sent, so they saw the returns screen an average of 1.5 times. Subjects in both treatments logged in about 16 times on average when not prompted by an e-mail.
The extra return viewings by subjects who received weekly e-mails did not merely crowd out or coincide with return viewing that they would have engaged in anyway. In the exit questionnaire, we asked subjects, "Did participating in this study make you see the ups and downs of the market more often than you otherwise would have?" Subjects could respond that participation made them see the fluctuations "more often," "less often," or that it had "no effect."
In the weekly e-mail treatment, 79% of subjects reported that participation made them see the ups and downs of the market more often, versus 57% of subjects in the biannual e-mail treatment. Because these responses do not indicate how much more often study participation made them see returns, this 22% gap (p < 0.01) likely understates the effect being in the weekly treatment had on return viewing relative to being in the biannual treatment. Only 1% of subjects in the weekly e-mail treatment and 2% of subjects in the biannual e-mail treatment reported that the study caused them to see market fluctuations less often.
In the first column of Table 7 , we analyze the impact of the ongoing return presentation treatments on the initial fraction of the portfolio invested in equities. The table reports coefficients from OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the total fraction of the portfolio invested in equities at the beginning of the experiment and the explanatory variables are a dummy for being sent biannual (instead of weekly) e-mails and a dummy for being shown ongoing portfolio-level (instead of asset-by-asset) returns.
We find that anticipating biannual rather than weekly e-mails raises the initial allocation to equities by only 0.6 percentage points, an increase not significantly different from zero. The point estimate is two orders of magnitude smaller than the 28.7 percentage point increase Thaler et al. (1997) find when subjects are shown yearly ongoing returns rather than monthly ongoing returns. 18 We can reject at the 95% confidence level the hypothesis that the increase is more than 3.7 percentage points, and we cannot reject the hypothesis that being sent e-mails biannually instead of weekly decreases equity shares by as much as 2.5 percentage points.
We also find that telling subjects that they would see ongoing returns consolidated at the portfolio level rather than separately by each asset decreases equity investment by a statistically significant 5.0 percentage points. Recall that Anagol and Gamble (forthcoming) find that a similar manipulation significantly increases portfolio risk-taking. The fact that we estimate a significant result in the opposite direction indicates that a lack of statistical power does not explain our failure to identify a positive effect of portfolio-level return aggregation on risktaking.
D. Effects of historical returns presentation aggregation
The second column of Table 7 reports the results of regressions estimating the effect that the historical returns graphs had on the initial portfolio fraction invested in equities. We find that simply viewing any historical returns graph significantly raises the initial equity share by 11 to 12 percentage points relative to not viewing a historical returns graph. However, it does not appear to matter whether the distributions of one-year returns or five-year annualized returns are presented. In fact-contrary to the increases in equity allocations ranging from 19 to 41 percentage points found by Benartzi and Thaler (1999) when their subjects were shown simulated 30-year return distributions rather than one-year return distributions-our subjects who saw the five-year returns initially allocated less to equities than subjects who saw the one-year graph, although the difference is not statistically significant. 19 Nor does it seem to matter whether subjects were able to see the return distributions of any mix of asset classes instead of only portfolios invested entirely in a single asset class. Being able to see the mixed asset class distributions is actually associated with a slightly lower initial allocation to equities, although the -0.4 percentage point effect is not significant.
Who is most affected by seeing the returns graphs? Table 8 shows estimates of graph treatment effect interactions with nine subject characteristics associated with greater financial sophistication: being more than 45 years old, having a bachelor's degree, having an annual income above $75,000, having over $75,000 in financial assets, having over 25% of one's nonexperimental financial assets invested in stocks, answering the compound interest question correctly, answering the diversification question correctly, answering the asset return volatility question correctly, and believing that the stock market follows a random walk. Almost all of the interactions are negative as expected, indicating that the graphs had a smaller effect on initial equity allocations among the more sophisticated. However, only the interactions with having a bachelor's degree are consistently significant. Those without a bachelor's degree increased their initial equity share by 17 or 18 percentage points when they saw the graphs. Those with a bachelor's degree increase their initial equity share by only 7 or 8 percentage points. We also see in the first column that subjects older than 45 react significantly less to the five-year graph. The age interaction with the one-year graph treatment effect is negative as well, but not significantly different from zero. (On the other hand, it is not statistically distinguishable from the age interaction with the 5-year graph treatment either.) 20 Table 9 shows how the graphs affected subjects' confidence in their investment decisions. The coefficients are from ordered probit regressions where the dependent variables are subjects' self-reported confidence in their investment decision, likelihood of changing their decision if they consulted with a professional investment advisor, and investment knowledge.
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19 Although using simulated 30-year returns in the long-horizon condition, as Benartzi and Thaler (1999) did, produces a stark contrast against one-year returns, simulated returns are difficult to explain to ordinary investors and are thus less likely to be employed in a real-world educational intervention. Reasonable five-year distributions can be computed from our 37-year historical sample period without resorting to simulation. 20 Subjects cannot allocate more than 100% to equities, and when no graphs are shown, more sophisticated subjects tend to allocate more to equities than unsophisticated subjects. One might thus suspect that the negative interactions are driven by the fact that the sophisticated have less room to increase their equity share in response to the graphs. However, the results are similar when estimated using a tobit with left-censoring at 0% and right-censoring at 100%. 21 See Table 4 for the exact wording of the questions used to elicit subjects' confidence and the distribution of answers to the questions. Choi, Laibson, and Madrian (2010) find that answers to these questions are correlated with higher-quality portfolio choices in the form of people choosing lower-fee S&P 500 index funds.
The point estimates indicate that the graphs made subjects more confident in their decision, less likely to change their decision if they consulted with a professional advisor, and more knowledgeable as investors. However, the only statistically significant coefficient is the effect of the one-year graph on confidence in the investment decision.
III. Robustness checks
A. Interactions with strength of loss aversion and mental accounting
Aggregating reported returns is thought to increase risk-taking because individuals are loss averse and engage in mental accounting. It is possible, then, that we would find positive aggregation effects on risk-taking among a subset of individuals who are most prone to loss aversion and mental accounting, even though there are no positive effects on average over our entire sample. We identify such individuals as the 47% of our sample who rejected the equal chance of winning $8 or losing $5, a choice that is difficult to explain in the absence of loss aversion and mental accounting. Table 10 adds interactions between the treatment dummies and a dummy variable for rejecting the small gamble. We see in the first column that the point estimate of the biannual email treatment effect is 2.3 percentage points higher among gamble rejecters than gamble accepters, but this difference is not significant. The overall biannual e-mail effect among gamble rejecters, -0.4 + 2.3 = 1.9 percentage points, is not significantly different from zero. Gamble rejecters respond 0.7 percentage points more negatively to portfolio-level return reporting than gamble accepters-in the opposite direction of the motivating hypothesis that gamble rejecters would be most prone to increase risk-taking in response to return aggregation-but this difference too is not significant.
The second column shows that there are no significant interactions of the graph-viewing effects with whether the subject turned down the small gamble. Gamble rejecters who saw the five-year graphs initially allocated a statistically insignificant 10.2 + 2.2 -(13.9 -3.1) = 1.6
percentage points more to equities than gamble rejecters who saw the one-year graph. Gamble rejecters who were able to see graphed return distributions of asset class mixes allocated an insignificant -1.9 + 2.7 = 0.8 percentage points more to equities than gamble rejecters who could see only single asset class return distributions.
B. Do aggregation effects emerge with a delay?
The subjects in Gneezy and Potters (1997) , Gneezy, Kapteyn, and Potters (2003) , Bellemare et al. (2005) , and Haigh and List (2006) did not need to first experience disaggregated ongoing return disclosure before reducing their portfolio risk. Instead, they reduced their demand for risky assets starting in the very first period of the experiments. It is nevertheless possible that our subjects initially did not realize how disaggregated ongoing return disclosure would affect their utility, but they gradually learned as they became exposed to these returns. This would lead to a relative decrease in the disaggregated groups' portfolio risk as the experiment progressed.
Our subjects were not inactive in their experimental accounts; the median number of days on which a subject made a reallocation is 2, and the average is 4.6.
We test for the gradual emergence of a positive aggregation effect on risk-taking by using the equity share halfway into the experimental period as the dependent variable in the first and third columns of Table 11 , and equity share at the end of the experiment as the dependent variable in the second and fourth columns. Equity share at the halfway point is measured eight days after subjects receiving weekly e-mails got their 26th e-mailed returns-checking link, and eight days after subjects receiving biannual e-mails got their first returns-checking link.
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The coefficient estimates in the first two columns indicate that throughout the investment period, reporting ongoing returns on an aggregated basis did not significantly increase portfolio risk-taking. The point estimate of the biannual e-mail treatment effect actually shrinks slightly from the 0.6 percentage points at the beginning of the investment period (in Table 7 ) to 0.5 percentage points at the halfway point, and it flips sign to -1.4 percentage points at the end of the experiment. The portfolio-level return reporting treatment effect also attenuates from a statistically significant -5.0 percentage points (in Table 7 ) to an insignificant -2.8 percentage points at the halfway point and an insignificant -3.8 percentage points at the end of the experiment.
22 By measuring allocations at this point, we capture the allocations of subjects receiving both weekly and biannual e-mails right after they have been induced to see their returns on the website via an e-mailed link. It may be particularly convenient to reallocate one's experimental portfolio right after clicking on the e-mailed link. Therefore, biannual subjects have had a chance to adjust their portfolios in response to market movements and the reporting regime via the same convenient channel weekly subjects had had available each week for the prior six months.
The last two columns show that although having seen historical returns graphs continued to raise equity share by about 9 percentage points through the remainder of the experiment, it still does not matter whether one-year or five-year return distributions were shown. Those seeing five-year graphs held 0.9 percentage points more in equities than those seeing one-year graphs at the halfway mark, and 1.5 percentage points less at the end of the experiment, but the differences are not significant.
C. Are our aggregation effects null because of negative expected equity returns?
Could our null effects be driven by some subjects believing that the expected return of equities is negative due to the market's drop prior to the start of the experiment? The same logic that causes some gambles with positive expected returns to appear more attractive under aggregation causes some gambles with negative expected returns to appear less attractive under aggregation.
The fact that our subjects initially allocated an average of 65.7% of their portfolio to equities suggests that they did not in fact believe that the expected return on equities was negative. We further test this story by running regressions of initial equity share on the treatment dummies and their interactions with a dummy for a subject believing that market returns follow a random walk. We classify a subject as believing in random walk returns if he says that neither a 10% increase nor a 10% decrease in the market last month should affect one's forecast of the market's return next month (see last two questions in the right column of Table 4 ). Table 12 shows these regression results. Contrary to the hypothesis that our treatment effects are attenuated by the market's drop prior to the experiment, we find no significantly different aggregation treatment effects among those who believe in random walk returns (and thus were unlikely to forecast a negative equity premium due to the pre-experiment market decline) versus those who believe in return momentum or reversal.
IV. Conclusion
Many financial behaviors are difficult to explain unless loss aversion and/or mental accounting are important determinants of economic choices. Such behaviors include aversion to small-stakes risks with positive expected values (Rabin, 2000; Rabin and Thaler, 2001) , the tendency to sell stocks with paper gains and hold stocks with paper losses (Shefrin and Statman, 1985; Odean, 1998) , and the failure to consider the asset allocation of non-salient accounts when making allocation decisions in a salient account (Choi, Laibson, and Madrian, 2009 ). Myopic loss aversion has also been proposed as a resolution of the equity premium puzzle (Benartzi and Thaler, 1995; Barberis, Huang, and Santos, 2001; Barberis, Huang, and Thaler, 2006) .
The importance of myopic loss aversion raises the possibility that the boundaries of investors' mental accounts could be manipulated by changes in information disclosure in order to increase risky asset demand. The experimental evidence to date has found that indeed, reporting only aggregated outcomes of multiple gambles increases subjects' willingness to take financial risks. However, because these previous experiments were not primarily concerned with studying the effects of information disclosure by financial institutions on portfolio allocations, they abstracted away from certain features of the typical investment environment that may moderate such effects. In particular, previous experiments have all taken place within a single session and have used laboratory assets. In order to gauge the potential impact of disclosure policy, our experiment had subjects invest in real financial assets over the course of an entire year. We find that disclosing returns at a more aggregated level does not increase portfolio risk-taking.
Although our results are surprising given some of the previous myopic loss aversion literature, they may be consonant with another part of that literature. Models that explain the equity premium with loss aversion (Benartzi and Thaler, 1995; Barberis, Huang, and Santos, 2001 ) find that investors must evaluate (and receive prospect theoretic utility from) returns only once a year in order to quantitatively match historical average equity returns. Because the typical investor probably sees stock market returns more frequently than once a year, these theoretical results suggest that simply seeing returns does not cause investors to experience utility flows. In the realization utility models of Barberis and Xiong (2009, forthcoming) that explain the disposition effect, investors receive prospect theoretic utility from returns only when they sell a security. The Barberis and Xiong framework may help reconcile our null results on return viewing frequency with the prior literature. Previous experiments on return disclosure frequency may have affected risk-taking because their treatments affected not just the frequency of return viewing, but also the perceived frequency of selling. All these experiments prevented the previous round's gamble proceeds from being invested in subsequent rounds (Gneezy and Potters, 1997; Gneezy, Kapteyn, and Potters, 2003; Bellemare et al., 2005; Haigh and List, 2006; Sutter, 2007; Fellner and Sutter, 2009; van der Heijden et al., 2011) and/or forced subjects to actively state a new allocation for their entire portfolio after every time they saw their returns, even if they wanted to keep the same allocation (Thaler et al., 1997; Langer and Weber, 2008) .
Therefore, each return-viewing event may have also been perceived as a portfolio liquidation event. Since return-viewing events in our experiment had neither of these features, they may have avoided confounding return viewing with perceived liquidations. Our results provide supportive evidence for the position that seeing a return alone may not be enough to create a prospect theoretic utility flow. Number of funds held 3.66 Table 6 . Website Visits After Initial Allocation This table shows, by return viewing inducement frequency, the average number of total visits to the study website per subject, the average total viewings of the returns screens per subject, and the average fraction of the available returns screens that were viewed by each subject. "Total visits to the website" include visits that involved viewing a returns screen. Standard errors are in parentheses. Table 7 . Aggregation Effects on Initial Equity Allocation The dependent variable is the percent of the portfolio allocated to equities at the start of the experiment. Biannual e-mail is a dummy for whether the subject was sent an e-mail with a link to his ongoing returns biannually. Portfolio-level return reporting is a dummy for whether the subject's ongoing returns were reported only at the consolidated portfolio level. 1-year graph is a dummy for whether the subject was shown graphs with one-year historical returns. 5-year graph is a dummy for whether the subject was shown graphs with five-year historical returns. Asset class mixes shown is a dummy for whether the subject saw a historical returns graphing tool that could show distributions of arbitrary asset class mixes. Point estimates from an OLS regression are shown, with standard errors in parentheses. Table 8 . Historical Return Graph Effect on Initial Equity Allocation Interacted with Subject Sophistication The dependent variable is the percent of the portfolio allocated to equities at the start of the experiment. 1-year graph is a dummy for whether the subject was shown graphs with one-year historical returns. 5-year graph is a dummy for whether the subject was shown graphs with fiveyear historical returns. The definition of the sophistication dummy varies by column: being older than 45, having at least a bachelor's degree, having an annual income above $75,000, having financial assets in excess of $75,000, allocating more than 25% of one's (non-experimental) financial assets to stocks, correctly answering the compound interest question, correctly answering that a single company's stock is riskier than a stock mutual fund, correctly answering that stocks are more volatile than bonds or savings accounts, and answering that neither a 10% increase nor a 10% decrease in the stock market in a given month predicts the next month's stock market return. Point estimates from an OLS regression are shown, with standard errors in parentheses. 5-year graph 15.9** 16.9** 12.9** 13.5** 11.9** 19.9** 5.0 15.4* 11.5** (2.9) (3.4) (2.8) (2.7) (2.7) (7.3) (7.2) (6.5) (3.1)
1-year graph × -5.2 -9.6* -1.0 -2.4 -2.7 -2.9 9.1 -2.7 6.0 Soph. dummy (4.4) (4.4) (4.4) (4.4) (4.4) (7.4) (7.3) (6.7) (4.5)
5-year graph × -11.5** -9.6* -4.8 -6.7 -3.6 -9.8 6.6 -4.9 -0.8 Soph. dummy (4.4) (4.4) (4.5) (4.5) (4.4) (7.7) (7.6) (6.9) (4.5) Sophistication 4.5 11.8** 5.6 9.2* 11.5** 9.0 -2.9 6.7 2.0 dummy (3.6) (3.6) (3.6) (3.6) (3.6) (6.2) (5. Table 9 . Historical Return Graph Effect on Investment Confidence The dependent variables are subjects' self-reported confidence that the investment decision they made was right for them, likelihood that they would change their portfolio decision if they consulted a professional investment advisor, and investment knowledge. The table shows coefficients from an ordered probit regression, with standard errors in parentheses. 1-year graph is a dummy for whether the subject was shown graphs with one-year historical returns. 5-year graph is a dummy for whether the subject was shown graphs with five-year historical returns. Thresholds 1 through 4 are the boundaries between categories estimated by the ordered probit.
Confidence in decision
Likelihood of changing decision Table 10 . Aggregation Effects on Initial Equity Allocation Interacted with Loss Aversion The dependent variable is the percent of the portfolio allocated to equities at the start of the experiment. Biannual e-mail is a dummy for whether the subject was sent an e-mail with a link to his ongoing returns biannually. Portfolio-level return reporting is a dummy for whether the subject's ongoing returns were reported only at the consolidated portfolio level. 1-year graph is a dummy for whether the subject was shown graphs with one-year historical returns. 5-year graph is a dummy for whether the subject was shown graphs with five-year historical returns. Asset class mixes shown is a dummy for whether the subject saw a historical returns graphing tool that could show distributions of arbitrary asset class mixes. Loss averse is a dummy for whether the subject turned down the win $8/lose $5 gamble we offered. Point estimates from an OLS regression are shown, with standard errors in parentheses. Table 11 . Aggregation Effects on Later Equity Allocations The dependent variable is the percent of the portfolio allocated to equities 27 weeks into experimental participation or at the end of the experiment. Biannual e-mail is a dummy for whether the subject was sent an e-mail with a link to his ongoing returns biannually. Portfolio-level return reporting is a dummy for whether the subject's ongoing returns were reported only at the consolidated portfolio level. 1-year graph is a dummy for whether the subject was shown graphs with one-year historical returns. 5-year graph is a dummy for whether the subject was shown graphs with five-year historical returns. Asset class mixes shown is a dummy for whether the subject saw a historical returns graphing tool that could show distributions of arbitrary asset class mixes. Point estimates from an OLS regression are shown, with standard errors in parentheses. Table 12 . Aggregation Effects on Initial Equity Allocation Interacted with Belief in Random Walk Returns The dependent variable is the percent of the portfolio allocated to equities at the start of the experiment. Biannual e-mail is a dummy for whether the subject was sent an e-mail with a link to his ongoing returns biannually. Portfolio-level return reporting is a dummy for whether the subject's ongoing returns were reported only at the consolidated portfolio level. 1-year graph is a dummy for whether the subject was shown graphs with one-year historical returns. 5-year graph is a dummy for whether the subject was shown graphs with five-year historical returns. Asset class mixes shown is a dummy for whether the subject saw a historical returns graphing tool that could show distributions of arbitrary asset class mixes. Random walk is a dummy for whether the subject believes that neither a 10% increase in the market in one month nor a 10% decrease in the market in one month should affect one's forecast of the market's return next month. Point estimates from an OLS regression are shown, with standard errors in parentheses. 
Ongoing reporting aggregation
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